The fifteen selections in this volume are collected around the thesis that many of the foundations and tenets of empiricism are mistaken and must be either rejected outright or radically revised. To introduce these essays, Morick briefly traces the development of modern empiricism from what he considers its source in Hume’s theory of knowledge through the phenomenalist stage to the present conception of empiricism, one of whose basic principles continues to be the fundamental role of observation in the acquisition of (...) knowledge: perception provides the foundation of empirical knowledge. It is particularly this "foundation picture" which has been denounced by many contemporary critics of empiricism as both oversimplified and misleading. The critics, including those in philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and scientists themselves, have proposed three related objections to this notion. The first is that rather than drawing a sharp distinction between observation claims and theoretical claims, observation claims must be understood in terms of a network of background assumptions. The second objection holds that it is this network of assumptions which bestows the very meaning on observation claims. Consequently, an observation term such as "red" will not maintain a fixed meaning throughout various changes in theories. Further, since the objection also covers observation words, the notion of ostensive words is rejected. The final objection is that our observations themselves should be looked upon as interpretations arising from these background assumptions rather than merely barren perceptions, isolated from one’s beliefs and preconceptions. The selections, most of which are well-known, specify these and other critical arguments and revisions. They are arranged into three slightly overlapping sections: "Empiricism and Ontology", "Empiricism and Science", and "Empiricism and Linguistics". Considering the purpose and scope of the book, the contributions have been appropriately chosen. An eight-page annotated bibliography is included.—B. G. H. (shrink)

The aim of Nordenstam’s capable but compact book is to examine the analytic-synthetic distinction and its relationship to empiricism in light of the criticisms expressed by W. V. Quine’s "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," M. G. White’s "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," and N. Goodman’s "On Likeness of Meaning." Nordenstam cites Pasch’s summary of the controversy: "Empiricism presupposes a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. There is no sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in natural languages (...) but only in artificial languages. But the artificial language approach is incompatible with empiricism. Therefore, empiricism has to be abandoned, or at least it has to be modified." In addressing this argument, Nordenstam begins with an explication of some of the basic concepts: the various interpretations of the principle of analyticity, the gradualist positions of Quine et al., the principle of empiricism, and the relationship between these two principles. From this analysis he concludes that one can legitimately hold the principle of empiricism and still reject the principle of analyticity, thereby denying the first assumption of the above argument. Focusing attention on the opposition to the analytic-synthetic distinction, he introduces a number of criticisms by Quine et al. of some twelve common definitions of "analytic statement" involving the notions of synonymy, state-descriptions, and semantical rules of artificial languages. Here Nordenstam’s suggestion is that the resultant criteria of analyticity and synonymy demanded by Quine et al. are excessively stringent. (shrink)

The eight relatively short papers in this volume were first presented at the International Institute of Philosophy Entretiens held at Helsinki in 1970. Four main topics are considered: the definition of knowledge, memory, Wittgenstein’s theory of knowledge, and evidence. Representing the first topic, B. A. O. Williams’ paper "Knowledge and Reasons" is chiefly directed toward examining the role of reasons in knowledge. His main thesis is that when speaking in general about knowledge, it is not necessary either that "the knower (...) be able to support or ground his true belief by reference to other propositions" or "that he be in any special state" concerning his belief. Yet it is necessary that, "given the truth of p, it is no accident that A believes p rather than not-p." The author is quick to indicate that this formula is highly schematic and, as an analysis of knowledge, insufficient. A. J. Ayer, as commentator on Williams’ paper, tends to concur with and further amplify a number of Williams’ ideas. However, he does take issue with Williams on two main points: his remarks on the possibility of "radically impersonal knowledge" and his formula that true belief should not be accidental. Concerning the latter, Ayer, while aware of the outline form of Williams’ argument, is "sceptical of its power to yield a precise formula which would differentiate between knowledge and true belief" in a satisfactory manner. (shrink)

Blackburn’s book is concerned with a "certain way of reasoning" corresponding to that "belief which we have because we expect uniformities in our experience to be representative." In short, the subject is the problem of induction and the purpose is the redoubtable task of justifying inductive reasoning. The fundamental question to which the author addresses himself is "whether, and why, we are ever right to use I-evidence as a reason for an I-conclusion?". While Blackburn presents a sustained and intricate argument, (...) perhaps four of the major aspects of his study deserve particular mention. First, as a result of an inquiry into the concept of a reason, it becomes apparent that some sort of normative analysis of the concept is indicated. For one criterion of a reasoning procedure must be reliability; such a procedure should generally result in the truth. Moreover, there is a distinct relationship between having confidence in a proposition and that proposition being true. Ultimately, "the authority of reasoning is nothing more, nor less, than the authority of truth.". (shrink)

Munsat’s objective in collecting eleven selections on the analytic-synthetic distinction is to acquaint the beginning or intermediate student with the major aspects of the issue. The selections are presented in historical sequence and Munsat has effectively edited the works such that one can easily follow the development of the distinction without having to contend with excessive peripheral material. The editor provides a short introduction to the varieties of truth as well as prefatory notes to each selection. Beginning with brief selections (...) from Leibniz and Hobbes, the treatment of necessary and contingent truths is traced through Kant and Mill. The Mill selection, "Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths," deals with the inductive foundations of the deductive sciences and mathematics. This line of investigation reaches its climax in the Frege passages on the nature of arithmetical propositions and Russell’s "What is an Empirical Science?" Of particular importance are portions of three classic contributions to the analytic-synthetic distinction: Kant’s Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, W. V. Quine’s critical "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and the rebuttal to Quine’s attack by Grice and Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma." Finally, the segment of J. L. Austin’s "The Meaning of a Word" could just as well have been excluded in the interest of continuity and in deference to some more appropriate selection. Munsat has included a useful nineteen-page bibliography.—B. G. H. (shrink)

The main purpose of Alexander’s book is "to lay a foundation for modes of philosophical thinking and many of the traditional problems of philosophy by an examination of the manner in which ideas are constructed." Toward this end, the book is divided into three parts. The first part deals mainly with language and its constituent questions. The mechanics of communication are presented including a detailed breakdown of its elements and the reasons for its success and failure. With respect to the (...) study of language, Alexander explores such questions as the learning of a language, the study of grammar, the nature of words, and the relation of thought to language. In his section on symbols, the author considers the nature of symbols, the relationship of symbols to their referents, and the distinction between and uses of signs and symbols. The fourth major topic in this section, the concept of meaning, centers around the kinds of referential meaning and the relation of existential variability to class relations. Views mentioned range from Plato to Chomsky, Piaget, and Austin. This first part serves as a backdrop to the more central part dealing with processes of thinking. Analyzed are three basic processes: abstracting, imagining, and generalizing. Three varieties of abstractions: qualities, relations, and functions, are deemed sufficiently important to warrant sustained treatment. Imagining, "the altering of abstractions," is of primary importance in the understanding of the nature of thought. His account of the process of generalizing explicates, among other issues, the concept of universals and their existential status. This section is neatly tied together by an examination of the interrelationships between these three processes in which he appropriately draws upon the major figures of Greek and modern philosophy. Throughout the presentation, the ways in which these processes are expressed linguistically is never lost sight of. The final part of the book, dealing with the nature of rational inquiry, centers upon the concepts of defining, inferring, and systematizing. While the book was designed as an introductory text, its usefulness is certainly not limited to this purpose.—B. G. H. (shrink)